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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND AFFIRMATIVE
EQUITABLE RELIEF: SWANN AND BEYOND
In 1954, Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)' imposed on the
states the duty to cease the establishment and maintenance of racially
separate public schools. This general directive has presented a multitude
of problems with which district courts and courts of appeals have had to
contend for nearly two decades. In attempting to formulate detailed and
specific guidelines for the implementation of Brown's mandate, the courts
have improvised and experimented, thereby creating greater uncertainties
and increased litigation.
2
While the most publicly controversial issue now arising from Brown
I is the issue of affirmative relief in the form of busing students,3 culmi-
nating in Bradley v. School Board,4 other more basic problems serve to
question the continuing validity of the present judicial approach to school
desegregation. These problems will be discussed through a consideration
of three major areas: (1) the development of an affirmative duty to inte-
grate, (2) the contours of equitable relief, and (3) alternative remedies for
presently existing school segregation which is deemed not susceptible to
judicial relief.
L De Jure Segregation
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution prohibits the denial of
equal protection of the laws to any citizen of the United States. However,
the "No state shall ... " language of the amendment s indicates that the
'347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2
1t is interesting to note that 166 school segregation cases were heard in the Fifth
Circuit between December 2, 1969, and September 24, 1970. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14 n.5 (1971).
3To date some 50 constitutional amendments prohibiting busing to achieve racial
balance have been proposed and are being considered by the House Judiciary Committee.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1972, § E at 4, col. 3.
'345 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), vacated, 382 U.S. 103 (1965) (Free Choice); No. 3353 (E.D.
Va. Jan. 5, 1972) (Consolidation); 325 F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Va. 1971) (City Integration); 53
F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Va. 1971) (Fees).
5The fourteenth amendment provides in part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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prohibition has exclusive reference to state action resulting in that denial.
Upon this basis, Brown I, relying largely upon sociological and psychol-
ogical data indicating detriment to children in segregated schools, de-
clared segregation by race in public schools to be a denial of equal protec-
tion. "Historically. . .[de jure segregation] meant the existence of state-
created dual school systems. . . .[I]t was a mandate by the legislature,
carried into effect by a school board, whereby students were assigned to
schools solely by race."' It is still state-created, or de jure, segregation
upon which courts must base any finding of a constitutional violation.
7
However, the historical definition is no longer entirely valid. No longer
is de jure segregation limited to prior state-required dual systems' or their
remaining effects. The term applies also to systems administered under
state policies reflecting a segregative effect? Further, the definitional
boundaries of state action have been greatly expanded.
Before turning to extensions of the de jure concept, it is important to
note judicial responses to situations determined to fall within the concept.
Brown I struck down state-imposed segregation. Brown 110 sought to
provide remedial measures by which to eliminate the segregation which
in fact remained after legislative school segregation was declared uncon-
stitutional. Nonetheless, by 1968 when the Supreme Court considered
Green v. County School Board," very little progress had been made in
areas where dual school systems had historically been maintained by
operation of state laws.
The development of equitable remedies for violations of the equal
protection clause has essentially been one of moving from the negative
prohibition of official segregation to the affirmative duty to integrate.
The decision in Green was the doctrinal turning point wherein the Court
focused not upon the neutrality of the school board's policy but upon its
failure to eliminate the effects of past discrimination. The duty of school
officials is no longer one of simply refraining from discriminatory policies
but one of undoing the present results of a prior dual system. At the same
time, the court's role is expanded in that it must judge how well the
'Gomperts v. Chase, 92 S. Ct. 16, 17 (1971).
'Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971).
'"[Slchools. . .[maintained] under laws requiring or permitting segregation according
to race." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954). Since such laws no longer
exist, any reference in this note to "dual systems" refers to those existing previously to
Brown I and not to presently segregated systems maintained through covert
discrimination. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d 990, 999 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
granted, 92 S. Ct. 707 (1972); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 940 (1961).
'Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
1391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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authorities have fulfilled the affirmative duty. Tracing the development
of the affirmative duty and the concomitant expansion of a court's equita-
ble power to act in case of default is an important prelude to assessing
the present judicial commitment.
The role of the lower courts was initially cast in narrow, passive terms
by a district court in Briggs v. Elliott.'" Holding that the states need not
mix persons of different races in the schools, the court declared only that:
[A] state may not deny to any person on account of race the right
to attend any school that it maintains . . . . The Constitution, in
other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids
[segregation]."
The spirit if not the letter of Briggs pervaded the approach to desegre-
gation until the mid-1960s.11 School officials merely had to lower the
official barriers to allow Negro students to exercise their personal right
to attend the school of their choice. That the choice was rarely exercised
was seen as no concern of the state; "compulsory integration" was anath-
ema to individual freedom since the fourteenth amendment prohibited
only official discrimination.
Virtually overlooked was the fact that a freedom-of-choice policy,
however neutral, served to perpetuate prior segregation, for the previous
student assignment patterns under the pre-Brown I separate-but-equal
rule were otherwise adhered to.'5 The doctrinal basis for equitable power
to remedy the effects of past discrimination, from which a court could
order school boards to take affirmative action to overcome those effects,
simply had not developed.
The development of this equitable doctrine eventually materialized,
arising out of litigation over voting rights rather than school desegrega-
* tion. In United States v. Louisiana,6 a three-judge court was confronted
with a long history of state efforts to keep Negroes off voter registration
2132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
3Id. at 777.
"For a comprehensive review of the effect Briggs had upon case law in the various
circuits see United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.), affd
en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
"See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 432-33 (1968), which noted that the
state's pupil placement statute, until its repeal in 1966, operated to assign children each year
to the school previously attended, unless upon application the state board assigned them to
another school. In addition, the possible bias with which such a statute could be adminis-
tered tended to place covertly discriminatory obstacles in the way of black students and
parents attempting to exercise the ostensible grant of a "free choice." See Bradley v. School
Bd., 345 F.2d 310, 321 (4th Cir.), vacated, 382 U.S. 103 (1965) (Free Choice) (Sobeloff &
Bell, JJ., dissenting in part).
1"225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), affd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
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lists. Discriminatory administration of a vague "interpretation"' 7 test had
in the past disenfranchised practically all Negroes in Louisiana. The court
enjoined that test as unconstitutional, but in the course of litigation the
state enacted a new "citizenship"' 8 test which purported to be neutral on
its face. But it also was to be applied only to voters registering for the
first time. Precluded from ruling that a neutral literacy test was itself
unconstitutional, 9 the court nevertheless enjoined its enforcement in
order to alleviate the effects of past discrimination. The court reasoned
that unless the citizenship test were to apply to all prospective voters in
a statewide re-registration, the "new test . ..will have the effect of
perpetuating the differences created by the discriminatory practices of the
past."2 Without a general re-registration, the burden of the new test
would fall primarily upon those Negroes who had been disenfranchised
by the prior unconstitutional "interpretation" test. Grounding its reason-
ing in fragments of prior voting rights cases,2 the court synthesized its
newly-discovered equitable principle:
The cessation of prior discriminatory practices cannot justify the
imposition of new and onerous requirements, theoretically applic-
able to all, but practically affecting primarily those who bore the
brunt of previous discrimination. An appropriate remedy therefore
should undo the results of past discrimination as well as prevent
future inequality of treatment. A court of equity is not powerless
to eradicate the effects of former discrimination. If it were, the
State could seal into permanent existence the injustices of the
past.
22
The Supreme Court had no difficulty in approving this expansion of
equitable power under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
17The test required applicants to be able to give a reasonable interpretation of a section
of the Louisiana state constitution chosen by the registrar. The court found that the stan-
dards for passing the test were unconstitutionally vague, that the test was unfairly adminis-
tered to Negroes and sometimes not at all to whites, and that it was void generally on the
grounds that too much discretion was placed in the hands of the registrar. Id. at 382-83.
raThe applicant was required to draw one of ten cards and then from it answer four
out of six multiple-choice questions correctly. The test was more difficult, but since there
was no prior history of its administration from which the court could find discrimination
or arbitrary power, the test could not be faulted constitutionally. Id. at 392-93.
"The Supreme Court had upheld a literacy test which was fair on its face and neutrally
applied. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
20225 F. Supp. at 393.
"Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733 (5th Cir.
1963), United States v. Dogan, 314 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Lynd, 301
F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 893 (1963): United States v. Penton, 212
F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
2225 F. Supp. at 393.
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clause, laying down a rule that was later to be implemented in Green:
We bear in mind that the court has not merely the power but the
duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination
in the future?23
Faced with fundamentally the same problem in both voting rights and
school desegregation cases-intractable state resistance to minority
group advancement-the courts deemed Louisiana's equitable principle 4
aptly suited for application to the latter. A compelling fact situation in
Green2 prompted the Court to go beyond a mere examination of whether
the school board had ceased to discriminate. Instead, noting that "[tihis
deliberate perpetuation of the unconstitutional dual system can only have
compounded the harm of such a system,' 2 the Court demanded a plan
21Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
21The concept became known as the "freezing" principle because it suspended the
operation of a new literacy test until the effects of the discrimination under the prior invalid
test were undone. The Fifth Circuit in a subsequent case, United States v. Ward, 349 F.2d
795 (5th Cir. 1965), spoke with obvious approval of its use as an equitable tool:
Like decisions in other fields, this was but new material out of which,
with much coming later, and in the best Anglo-American juridical tradi-
tion, we synthesize principles and sanctions which experience demon-
strates are needed. This experience has been rich, abundant in volume, and
instructive . . . .From it we have . . . learned that unless there is some
appropriate way to equalize the present with the past, the injunctive prohi-
bitions even in the most stringent, emphatic, mandatory terms forbidding
discrimination in the future, continues for many years a structure commit-
ting effective political power to the already registered whites while exclud-
ing Negroes from this vital activity of citizenship.
Id. at 802.
?-The county had two schools, one all black, one all white. There was no pattern of
residential segregation; black and white students were bused from all parts of the county to
their respective schools. Under the State Pupil Placement Board, no black student had
asked for a transfer through 1964. In 1965, under threat of loss of financial aid, the school
board adopted a freedom-of-choice plan. Prior assignments were continued unless a transfer
was requested, and the county-wide busing continued. The county appeared before the Court
in 1968 with virtually completely segregated schools. 391 U.S. at 431-37. The county's
argument that their plan could be faulted only by reading the fourteenth amendment as
requiring "compulsory integration"-that they had fulfilled their duty by ceasing to dis-
criminate under Brown ll-proved disastrous for segregationists in light of the breadth of
the Green holding.
2391 U.S. at 438. Therein lay the crucial retroactive element in Green. States which
had made the transition from discrimination to "neutrality" were mistakenly following the
narrow Briggs interpretation by viewing the segregation which continued after the transition
as de facto: the result of private choice. Green retroactively converted this "de facto"
segregation into de jure, repudiating the Briggs theory as having ignored the crux of Brown
II
Brown II was a call for. . . dismantling. . . tempered by an awareness
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that "promises realistically to work now. ' 27 The burden of securing a
desegregated education was now shifted from the individual to the state,
which shift was accompanied by an increase in the court's equitable
power. The courts were now endowed with the power to evaluate a pro-
posed desegregation plan, weighing its provisions in light of other feasible
and possibly more effective alternatives.3
The ghost of Briggs, and its simplistic distinction between "desegrega-
tion" and "integration" as to the duty of the school board, had thus been
laid to rest. Plaintiffs now had the leverage with which to attack token
desegregation in any system where the existing imbalance was traceable
to prior discriminatory policies. Green did not simply invalidate a partic-
ular "freedom-of-choice" plan, but it ruled that all plans for dismantling
prior dual systems would henceforth be judged by their results.
As noted above, the Supreme Court had little difficulty in drawing
upon the equitable doctrine that had been developed in earlier voting
rights cases. Whatever functional differences existed between the securing
of voting rights and the establishment of unitary school systems were
simply passed over in Green in order to formulate a much-needed man-
date applicable especially to the South.
Yet, considering the pivotal importance of Green's broad holding as
the source from which presently existing equitable power is drawn, it is
worthwhile to stop and examine the differences passed over in Green.
Primarily, the end for which affirmative relief was fashioned in Louisiana
was conceptually clear: the voting franchise. Quite difficult constitutional
questions are involved in determining what conditions the state may place
that problems would arise . . [requiring] time and flexibility ....
School boards .. . then operating state-compelled dual systems were
nevertheless clearly charged with the affirmative duty . . . to convert to
a unitary system ....
Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added).
Although it may have been argued that Brown M's language did not explicitly support
the reading given to it by Green, the groundwork for finding an affirmative duty had been
laid rather persuasively in a classic Fifth Circuit decision. United States v. Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 861-78 (5th Cir.), affd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). As has been noted, both Green and Jefferson, unlike Brown
II, could find doctrinal support for their position in the "freezing" principle used in voting
rights cases, wherein it has been reasoned that equity must be able to act to overcome the
effects of past discrimination. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965). It should
be noted that primary credit for the synthesis of the affirmative relief concept in racial
discrimination cases should go to Judge Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit, who wrote both the
lower court decision in Louisiana and the first opinion in Jefferson.
113 9 1 U.S. at 439.
2Id.
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upon its exercise,29 but there is no difficulty in identifying the vote as an
entity. The contours of a "unitary school system" are not so easily identi-
fiable. Identification is tied to the complexities and variables existing in
the locality out of which the school system is created, thus inviting dispute
in each instance over what is to be achieved. Likewise, the difficulty of
defining the limits of either the school board's duties or the court's powers
acts as a stimulant to litigation.
A second basic difference lies in how the remedial pursuit of equal
voting opportunity and nondiscriminatory school systems affects private
individuals. There are no countervailing costs or considerations involved
in the pursuit of equal voting rights for minorities by the use of the
Louisiana rule to remedy the effects of the past. But it is an inescapable
fact that attainment of the constitutional mandate of Green involves
considerable individual sacrifice.3 0 The accompanying frustration is
heightened by the fact that private individuals have virtually no voice in
a school desegregation decree in which a court touches upon matters of
intense public concern.
Conversely, and perhaps most importantly, equal voting opportunity
is by its nature bound up almost exclusively with state action. Private
action and discrimination do not materially affect the duty owed by the
state to the minority group under the command of "No state shall. .. ."
On the other hand, school segregation may well reflect only a neighbor-
hood segregated by private discrimination. But notwithstanding difficul-
ties in the application of the affirmative duty, it is apparent that in terms
of the actual elimination of segregation this duty is the most important
and desirable adjunct of the de jure label.
The affirmative duty, moreover, is not easily circumscribed. Although
it will be seen that good faith is an important factor in determining the
validity of present school policies, such is not the case where a dual
system previously existed and an affirmative duty has been imposed:
"[G]ood faith does not excuse . . .non-compliance with . . . [the] af-
firmative duty to liquidate the dual system." 31 Only when a desegrega-
tion plan is acceptable (i.e., fulfills the affirmative duty) does good faith
become relevant. Once good faith does become relevant, Green indicates
that it is an essential ingredient of an effective plan by pointing out that
2The Supreme Court abolished the poll tax in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966), and the arbitrary ban on servicemen's voting rights in Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89 (1965). The Court upheld Congress' exercise of power in the Voting Rights
Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970), to abolish all literacy tests. See
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
3OSee, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd. (Consolidation), No. 3353 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 1972).
3 tHenry v. Clarksdale Mun. Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d 682, 684 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969).
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even though a plan be effective, the availability of more promising courses
of action may indicate a lack of good faith. If this appears to be the case,
the school board will have the burden of justifying its preference for the
less effective method.
32
Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District,33 a case
involving a school board's adoption of a geographic zoning plan, held that
although the school board had used good faith in its selection of zoning
criteria," its good faith was irrelevant in that the plan failed to disesta-
blish the dual school system. In essence, the board had failed to take into
account the most important criterion: desegregation. Admitting the gen-
eral relevance of the criteria used, the court of appeals nonetheless main-
tained that ordinarily relevant and rational criteria may be insufficient
to meet constitutional standards.
35
Further evidence that desegregation is the overriding consideration in
any plan proposed to eliminate dual school systems is furnished by United
States v. Indianola Municipal Separate School District.36 In holding that
a plan does not promise to work if it presently provides no desegregation
whatever, the court of appeals invalidated a plan which failed to result in
substantial desegregation. The existence of several nondiscriminatory
reasons for adoption of the plan (i.e., safety, proximity of residences to
schools, and maximum utilization of existing facilities) did not justify the
lack of consideration of desegregation in formulating the plan
7.3
Litigation has been particularly prevalent in those situations in which
school boards have ceased overt discrimination but have substituted plans
tending to reinforce dual school systems. The courts have consistently
invalidated plans by which school boards have evaded, intentionally or
otherwise, the constitutional mandate of Brown I s Realizing that these
32391 U.S. at 439.
-409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969).
31The criteria used were: maximum utilization of school buildings, density of popula-
tion, proximity of pupils to schools, natural boundaries, and the welfare of the students.
Id. at 687.
3It should be remembered that de jure segregation resulting from prior dual systems
is not the only instance in which a standard otherwise relevant has been declared inadequate
to satisfy constitutional mandates. For example, although literacy tests bear a rational
relationship to the right to vote, they may be struck down where the tests tend to freeze the
effects of past discrimination. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 296-97 (1969);
text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
38410 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1970).
371d. at 628.
38Although the following examples are by no means an exhaustive list, they are indica-
tive of neutral plans which, although they appeared fair, tended to perpetuate segregated
systems: Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968) (Tennessee "free transfer"
plan); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (Virginia "freedom of choice"
plan); Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968) (Arkansas "freedom of choice" plan);
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cases involve school systems previously maintained as dual, one must
nevertheless assume that a system without a history of duality in the
Brown I sense," but in which covert discrimination has been practiced,
will be required to eliminate whatever segregative results its covert dis-
crimination has had. To counteract the lack of progress in the years
following Brown I, the courts have developed less stringent standards in
order to find state action.
Of necessity, the determination that segregation exists must be made
before the problem of state action in assigning responsibility is con-
fronted. In addition to student assignment, the most important indicia of
a segregated system are existing policies and practice in regard to faculty,
staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities." Systems
whose schools are racially identifiable in terms of these indicia may be
said to be segregated systems4 and, if state-imposed, in violation of the
mandate to maintain unitary systems. 2 Though whether there is segrega-
tion must be a question of fact,4" the courts have had little trouble in
recognizing racial imbalance." However, only substantial proportional
balance is required:
Henry v. Clarksdale Mun. Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969) (geographic
zoning plan which took advantage of segregated residential patterns); Northcross v. Board
of Educ., 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962) (Tennessee pupil
assignment law not fulfilling the state's affirmative duty).
39Note 8 supra.
"0Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968); United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 846 (5th Cir.), affd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (1966), cert.
denied. 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
"Bradley v. School Bd. (Consolidation), No. 3353 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 1972), is the most
extreme example of how far a court has looked in order to find racial imbalance. The city
of Richmond is primarily black while the two surrounding counties are primarily white.
Disregarding the boundaries of the political subdivisions, the district court found racial
imbalance for the area as a whole.
12Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
4Since statutes no longer provide for the maintenance of dual systems, the courts must
look to the school system in practice. Though a negligible change in systems previously
having a dual system will indicate that the policies used are not effective, it must be
remembered that in the determination of whether segregation (i.e., racial imbalance) exists,
the prior maintenance of a dual system is irrelevant.
44See, e.g., Henry v. Clarksdale Mun. Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d 682, 689 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969) ("still all-Negro schools, or only a small fraction
of Negroes enrolled in white schools, or no substantial integration of faculties and school
activities. ... ); United States v. Greenwood Mun. Separate School Dist., 406 F.2d 1086
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 907 (1969) (1.8% of black students receiving integrated
education; only four white faculty and staff members in still-existing all-black schools);
United States v. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968), modified, 432 F.2d 1147
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971) (six schools within district, two with 99%
black enrollment and four almost exclusively white).
1972]
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The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean
that every school in every community must always reflect the
racial composition of the school system as a whole. 5
Having examined both the affirmative duty to disestablish racially
imbalanced schools caused by state-imposed segregation and the case-by-
case determinations of the existence of racial imbalance, the discussion
now turns to the standards by which the racial imbalance is found to be
de jure. From a review of the cases, it becomes clear that two situations
will allow a court to grant affirmative relief: (1) where a state has been
found to have previously maintained an intentionally segregated dual
school system and has not yet fulfilled its affirmative duty to eliminate
the vestiges of that system (even though presently utilizing an apparently
neutral school assignment plan); and (2) where a state or its agent, the
school board, has been found to be presently engaging in actively discrim-
inatory policies. It will be seen that, as worded, both situations fulfill the
two elements of de jure segregation: segregative practices and state ac-
tion. Since the actions of local school board officials are considered those
of the state acting through its agents" and since the affirmative duty to
convert to a unitary system falls upon state school boards as well as local
officials,47 the courts have found no difficulty in assigning to the state the
responsibility for any action by local officials. There has been, however,
some difficulty in formulating guidelines for assessing whether a practice
is discriminatory when engaged in by the state" and, indeed, in determin-
ing when a segregated school system can be linked to a causal chain
involving the state.
Previous cases have indicated that there are two basic approaches to
existing segregation. The first approach, used where de jure segregation
is found, focuses on and forbids segregative assignment on a racial basis
and requires the disestablishment of school segregation resulting there-
from. The second approach, that which would alleviate racial imbalance
where there is no showing that the imbalance was brought about by state
discrimination, would apparently have to focus on the fact that segrega-
tion exists and hold the cause irrelevant. This can be called the de facto
approach. While the de jure situation is the one in which the courts have
granted affirmative relief, there has been a trend toward a focus on the
"5Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971).
"See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1958); United States v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 659 (S.D. Ind. 1971).
tGodwin v. Johnston County Bd. of Educ., 301 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D.N.C. 1969).
"Since school board discrimination is attributed to the state for purposes of finding
state action, future use of the term "state" will encompass school board actions as well as
those of state agencies or officials.
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segregation itself. The de jure label has remained, but that which can be
called state action in causing segregation has far exceeded its traditional
boundaries.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Board of Education" and Spencer v. Kugler," go far toward
providing a comprehensive statement of the current law on de jure segre-
gation. Swann, although grounded in the dejure approach, moves slightly
toward the second approach while Spencer appears to reaffirm Swann's
at least temporary limit on that movement.
The assignment plan deemed inadequate in Swann was not one of
intentional gerrymandering of districts based on race but was a seemingly
innocent neighborhood school plan assigning students to the school near-
est their homes. The Court held that, notwithstanding the fact that racial
criteria had not been used, the plan would not fulfill the school board's
affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system. The violation was the
result of the Court's finding of a causal connection between the board's
past discrimination and the present segregation.5 ' In other words, the
Court's focus was that of the first, or de jure, approach above. The past
wrongdoing engendered a finding of state-imposed segregation.
Although the holding did not derive from a focus on the segregated
pattern of school attendance itself, the Court's establishment of an evi-
dentiary presumption, resolving doubts against the school board,52 does
9402 U.S. I (1971).
-92 S. Ct. 707 (1972), affg mem. 326 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D.N.J. 1971).
"The connection was suggested by the assumption that previous dual systems caused
racial groups to live nearest their respective schools, thereby influencing the patterns of
residential development. Further, past choices regarding size and location of school con-
struction "may well [have promoted] segregated residential patterns which, when combined
with 'neighborhood zoning' further [locked] the school system into the mold of separation
of the races." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971). These
choices were often in the form of closing schools which appeared likely to become racially
mixed through changes. in residential patterns and building new schools in white areas
farthest from the boundaries of black population expansion. In addition, construction of
schools so small as to be able to accommodate only a racially homogenous area was and
may continue to be an attempt to perpetuate segregation. The Court stressed:
In ascertaining the existence of legally imposed school segregation,
the existence of a pattern of school construction and abandonment is...
a factor of great weight. In devising remedies where legally imposed segre-
gation has been established, it is the responsibility of local authorities and
district courts to see to it that future school construction and abandonment
are not used and do not serve to perpetuate or restablish the dual system.
Id.
"The presumption is stated as follows:
[I]n a system with a history of segregation the need. . . to assure a school
authority's compliance with its constitutional duty warrants a presump-
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move toward the second, or de facto, approach. It has been suggested that
this presumption is a response "to the fact that . . . causal connections
between past discrimination and present segregation [used in Swann] are
no more than theoretical possibilities and obviously involve significant
elements of conjecture. ' 53 It must be noted that the Court did not hold
that segregated patterns are sufficient, in themselves, to establish a consti-
tutional violation. It emphasized the past discriminatory conduct and
limited the presumption to those school systems bearing the requirement
to convert from a dual system to a unitary system:
Where the school authority's proposed plan for conversion from
a dual to a unitary system contemplates the continued existence
of some schools that are all or predominantly of one race, they
have the burden of showing that such school assignments are genu-
inely nondiscriminatory. The court should scrutinize such schools,
and the burden upon the school authorities will be to satisfy the
court that their racial composition is not the result of present or
past discriminatory action on their part.54
The burden is a heavy one. Not only must the board show assignment
on a basis other than race, but it must also show that it has contributed
no part of the causal chain producing the segregated residential patterns
on which the plan is allegedly based. The extreme difficulty of bearing
the burden will, of necessity, lead to a focus on the segregated patterns
themselves. Emphasizing further that the evidentiary presumption is not
to be strained to encompass all segregated patterns, Swann points out
that no year-by-year adjustments of racial balance in schools are to be
made "once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished
and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the
system." 5  There must be a showing that some agency of the state has
deliberately affected the racial composition of the schools through the
alteration of demographic patterns in order to achieve resegregation.
Spencer v. Kugler"6 reaffirms the limitation that is implicit in Swann:
although racial imbalance alone will provide a presumption against
school systems which were previously dual, segregated patterns of school
tion against schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial
composition.
Id. at 26. For the burden which this presumption forces upon the school board see text
accompanying notes 54-55 infra.
"Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School De-
segregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697, 700 (1971).
11402 U.S. at 26.
5 Id. at 32.
5192 S. Ct. 707 (1971), affg mem. 326 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D.N.J. 1971).
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attendance per se will not provide a ground for judicial relief. Racial
imbalance in Spencer was caused solely by housing patterns within the
school districts with no showing that state action had contributed to those
patterns. The Supreme Court held that racial imbalance caused by factors
other than discriminatory state action was not susceptible to federal judi-
cial intervention.
It would seem clear that in the absence of a previously dual system,
Swann and Spencer preclude the possibility of judicial relief for school
segregation when that segregation is the result solely of districts inno-
cently based upon housing patterns. However, although an impartially
maintained neighborhood school plan does not per se violate constitu-
tional rights even when the result is racial imbalance, the motives of the
school board may be examined to determine whether there is a purposeful
desire to perpetuate segregation. A course of conduct so motivated will
result in an infringement of the students' constitutional rights.
57
Nonetheless, there is a further question presented. If state action other
than that of school boards (e.g., public housing practices, state enforce-
ment of previously existing restrictive covenants, state enforcement of
discriminatory FHA policies prior to 1947)58 results in segregated residen-
tial patterns, are students in the resulting segregated schools entitled to
judicial relief? In other words, is the school board violating constitutional
rights when basing attendance zones upon segregated housing patterns
which were arrived at by discriminatory state actions of agencies other
than school boards? Swann59 and Spencer did not deal with the question,
but Swann does predict the result of an action brought on that basis:
The elimination of racial discrimination in public schools is a large
task and one that should not be retarded by efforts to achieve
broader purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction of school authori-
ties. One vehicle can carry only a limited amount of baggage. It
would not serve the important objective of Brown I to seek to use
school desegregation cases for purposes beyond their scope, al-
7Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d 990, 1000 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 92
S. Ct. 707 (1972); see United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.
Ind. 1971); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 429 (D.D.C. 1967), modified sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); People v. San Diego Unified School Dist.,
19 Cal. App. 3d 252, 96 Cal. Rptr. 658 (Ct. App. 1971).
mSee Spencer v. Kugler, 92 S. Ct. 707 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
5
'Swann specifically mentions the problem:
We do not reach in this case the question whether a showing that school
segregation is a consequence of other types of state action, without any
discriminatory action by the school authorities, is a constitutional viola-
tion requiring remedial action by a school desegregation decree.
402 U.S. at 23.
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though desegregation of schools ultimately will have impact on
other forms of discrimination."0
It would appear that while the acts of the agent (local or state school
boards) will be attributed to the master (the state), the converse is not
true.' Although intentional perpetuation of segregation by a school board
is susceptible to judicial relief, it nonetheless appears that school boards
may innocently utilize housing patterns and not be considered to have
thereby adopted other discriminatory acts of the state. Of course, such
an analysis does not preclude judicial relief for the other forms of discrim-
ination. It indicates rather that the relief should be sought directly rather
than through a school desegregation action.
If this analysis is correct, it has a serious impact upon the language
of other cases. Davis v. School District,12 though apparently correctly
decided, uses broad language which seems to be in conflict with the
analysis. The district court found that the racially identifiable nature of
faculty and administration in the district's schools constituted a prima
facie showing of a constitutional violation. The school board failed to
show that the faculty imbalance resulted from nondiscriminatory con-
duct. The court's finding is in accordance with the presumption found in
Swann, which may be used to infer a segregative motive in drawing
district lines according to housing patterns. Intentional segregation by
school boards as found in Davis is, of course, de jure. However, the
court's language implied that it also found intent because the resulting
segregation was foreseeable. Emphasizing that there was no difference
between a sin of commission and a sin of omission, the court maintained
that:
When the power to act is available, failure to take the necessary
steps so as to negate or alleviate a situation which is harmful is as
wrong as is the taking of affirmative steps to advance that situa-
tion. 3
Although the case's factual findings support the determination of
intentional wrongdoing, the above-quoted language goes much farther,
apparently assigning responsibility to a school board when it draws its
lines in accordance with segregated housing patterns even though those
lines are not gerrymandered. That position is in apparent conflict with
Swann if applied to a situation without a prior history of dual schools or
10ld. at 22-23.
"1But see text accompanying notes 62-67 infra.
11309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 92
S. Ct. 233 (1971).
63309 F. Supp. at 741.
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where duality and its effects had been eliminated. Indeed, without a
finding -that the school board had contributed to the present patterns, the
language of the district court in Davis would seem to be in conflict with
the very position to which the opinion later gives recognition:
This Court acknowledges the recently enunciated position that a
Board of Education has no affirmative duty to eliminate segrega-
tion when it has done nothing to create it. .... 1
Bradley (Consolidation)65 contains language which, if followed, would
have even greater effect:
School authorities may not constitutionally arrange an attendance
zone system which serves only to reproduce in school facilities the
prevalent pattern of housing segregation, be it publicly or privately
enforced. To do so is only to endorse with official approval the
product of private racism."
It must be remembered, however, that the court was confronted with a
previously dual school system. Therefore, the school board had an affirm-
ative duty to disestablish the segregation for which it was responsible. The
board had a heavy burden in seeking to show the lack of a causal chain
involving the state. Nonetheless, the Bradley (Consolidation) dictum
seems to say too much, for the state had a duty to disestablish only that
for which it (acting through state or local officials) was responsible. 7
Brown I was never construed to prohibit racially imbalanced schools
provided they are established and maintained on racially neutral cri-
teria." Assuming no intent to segregate or to perpetuate privately caused
segregation, a school board cannot be found guilty of a constitutional
deprivation simply by basing school zones upon segregated residential
patterns to which school authorities did not contribute. 9
It is clear that the precise limits of de jure segregation have not yet
been drawn. Whether state discrimination in areas other than school
board activities is sufficient state action is still in controversy. Swann
places at least a temporary limit on relief fostered by the expansion of
the de jure concept. Thus a court's pronouncement that the state has
played no part in bringing about the segregation means that no relief can
14d. at 742.
"No. 3353 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 1972).
e1d. at 30.
"See cases cited note 127 infra.
"Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
847 (1967); Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (Ist Cir. 1965); Bell v.
School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
1GSpencer v. Kugler, 92 S. Ct. 707 (1972).
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be granted. If, as is generally recognized, the segregated school is inferior,
it can be little consolation to the minority student that his state did not
discriminate twenty years ago and is now, therefore, free to maintain
segregated schools.
II. Power to Remedy De Jure Segregation
Green increased the tempo of desegregation litigation, for, as one
writer has phrased it, "[o]nce loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily
cabined."75 Racial minorities pressed federal courts to find evidence of
prior discriminatory action, attempting to expand further the definition
of de jure segregation, in order to trigger the affirmative duty that Green
had imposed. But the lower courts had difficulty in ascertaining both the
scope of this affirmative duty and the limits of their remedial power when
the school authorities defaulted.
It is to Swann's response 1 to the lower courts' difficulties in framing
relief that the discussion now turns, specifically to cast light upon: (1) the
contours of the expansive commitment of equitable powers in Swann; (2)
possible difficulties raised by that commitment with respect to the future
course of school desegregation.
The Contours of Equitable Power in Swann
The decision in Swann represents an emphatic commitment of federal
judicial power and resources in aid of a minority: an attempt to counter
the effects of an apartheid policy to which the Southern states committed
their official power.7" That the strength of the commitment is equal to the
task-eliminating from school systems "all vestiges of state-imposed
segregation"-is evidenced by three characteristics of the holding in
Swann: 3 (1) a system with a past history of official segregation together
TCox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 91 (1966).
71Swann authorizes a panoply of remedial powers touching upon: (1) the quality of the
building, facilities, and staff: (2) racial composition of the faculty; (3) school placement and
construction; (4) racial composition of the student body; (5) attendance zones; (6)
transportation. 402 U.S. at 20-31.
2See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.), affd en
banc, 380 F.2d 385 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). Jefferson, the first clear
exposition of affirmative relief, declared that an expansion of equitable power was a neces-
sary development:
[T]he only adequate redress for a previously overt system-wide policy of
segregation directed against Negroes as a collective entity is a system-wide
policy of integration.
372 F.2d at 869. (original emphasis deleted).
"See Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School
Desegregation, 38 U. CHi. L. REv. 697 (1971).
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with a present substantial racial imbalance comes to the court with the
presumption of a constitutional violation;74 (2) once a violation is estab-
lished, an inquiry need not be made as to the degree of segregation
attributable to prior official discrimination with an eye toward confining
the remedial order to undo only past state action;75 (3) all other policy
considerations, apparently regardless of good faith,78 must yield to the
value of integration.
The Court in Swann emphasized further that its holding, in directing
the lower courts to exercise broad remedial power to correct the effects
of past discrimination, represented no substantial departure from tradi-
tional equitable principles. Attempting to counter possible claims that
Swann had gone significantly beyond the prior limits of federal judicial
power, the Court stressed the following: (1) the equitable power of the
federal courts to remedy past wrongs is broad;77 (2) equity provides flexi-
bility for balancing between public and private interests and between
competing private interests; 7 (3) fashioning equitable remedies in deseg-
regation cases is not fundamentally different from that done in other
cases which seek to remedy a constitutional wrong;79 (4) "[a]s with any
equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the rem-
edy."
8 0
74See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
15Fiss, supra note 73, at 705.
6An important pair of cases is now before the Court involving whether a small town,
formerly part of a county-wide school system, can form its own school district for revenue
purposes, in spite of the prior dual history of the system and the fact that the newly-created
district's percentage of white students would be substantially higher than the county-wide
white percentages existing before the separation. The plaintiffs successfully asserted that the
towns, regardless of whether increased revenues were the real motivation behind the separa-
tion, established "white enclaves;" the new school districts should be disallowed because
they reduced integration. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, reversing the district court in both
cases: Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1971). Both cases are now before
the Supreme Court on certiorari. 92 S. Ct. 47 (1971).
"The language used in Swann, though not cited, is traceable directly to Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 n.4 (1968):
If school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations under [Green],
judicial authority may be invoked. Once a right and a violation have been
shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable reme-
dies.
402 U.S. at 15.
7"The language quoted in Swann comes from Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-
30 (1944). Brown IH had paraphrased Hecht's language as part of its guidelines to the lower
courts.
11402 U.S. at 15-16.
81ld. at 16.
19721
294 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
The initial inquiry becomes one of examining the above four
assertions in order to discover whether they can properly serve to ground
the holding in Swann in traditional equitable principles. It is not precisely
clear what line of reasoning the Court envisaged, since little authority was
cited in support of the Court's propositions. With regard to the first
proposition it was pointed out above"' that inherent differences between
voting rights and desegegation may work against treating the two alike
in the application of a remedial principle developed in the former area.
Moreover, the implication that this remedial principle, first appearing in
1965 in Louisiana, occupies a traditional, immutable position in the
Court's "historic equitable remedial powers" cannot withstand analysis:
whatever wisdom inures to traditional equity principles through their
having survived the test of history cannot be imparted to affirmative
relief.
The second equity concept 8 was taken directly from Brown II. There
the Court made clear that the valid public interest in allowing time for
the systematic elimination of various statutory and administrative obsta-
cles" was a factor to be considered in spite of the plaintiffs' interest in
"admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis."84 Swann, notwithstanding its assertion that the public in-
terest is to be considered, affords little guidance as to what might validly
weigh against the minorities' right to a unitary school system. That the
costss of attaining the greatest degree of intergration possible might force
cut-backs in educational programs, including remedial education de-
signed to benefit the inner-city students, is not even mentioned in Swann.
Those public policies which might favor geographic zoning, neighborhood
schools, or decentralization, as public policies, must give way to remedies
which "may be administratively awkward, inconvenient and even bizarre
.". '86 Furthermore, the role that competing private interests should
normally play in the process of equitable adjustment is quite minimal.
Objections by any racial minority 7 to transportation plans apparently
can run only to situations
tText accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
82Note 78 supra.
'3Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
Mld. at 300.
"See Senator Walter F. Mondale's article, Busing in Perspective, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Mar. 4, 1972, at 18-19.
11402 U.S. at 28.
9The Chinese minority in San Francisco objected vehemently to the dispersal of their
children by buses throughout the city's schools under a court-ordered plan in Johnson v.
San Francisco Unified School Dist., - F. Supp. (N.D. Cal. 1971). Their application
for a stay was denied. Guey Heung Lee v. Johnson, 92 S. Ct. 14 (Douglas, Circuit Justice,
1971).
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
when the time or distance of travel is so great as to either risk the
health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational
process.88
It is submitted, then, that the Court's assertion that its holding is
grounded in the "essence of equity jurisdiction" 9 is simply not borne out
by the manner in which the actual affirmative remedies are framed; the
contours of "public interest" and "competing private claims," in light of
the stated goal of complete integration, remain amorphous at best.
The Court makes the further assertion that fashioning equitable reme-
dies in desegregation cases is not fundamentally different than the task
of framing relief in other cases of constitutional denials. No cases are
cited in support of this proposition, but the line of equal protection cases
which is suggested is that of Reynolds v. Sims" and subsequent holdings91
espousing the one-man, one-vote rule. However, despite protestations
that the Court would be ensnarled in the "political thicket,"92 the reme-
dial problems in the apportionment cases have not proven to be especially
complex, simply because the standard chosen-one-man, one-vote-has
been held to override almost all justifications for variance," leaving the
federal court with an exercise in simple arithmetic. A "unitary school
system," however, is a standard incapable of quantification. 4 It is the
proliferation of variables inherent'in the goal of freeing school systems
from racial discrimination which sets school desegregation cases apart
from other remedial problems arising under the Constitution.
Finally, the Court attempts to characterize Swann as falling under the
traditional precept that in equity, "the nature of the violation determines
the scope of the rerimedy." 95 One would expect to find language directing
the lower courts to tailor their decrees to undo only that portion of
existing segregation that is traceable to prior official action, leaving un-
touched the effects of private action. There would be conceptual merit to
such an attempt under the de facto-de jure distinction, but the almost
insurmountable proof problems probably kept the Court from making
the attempt. In any case, once a violation in a prior dual system is
demonstrated, Swann's remedial powers apparently operate to correct
8s402 U.S. at 30-31.
81Id. at 15.
90377 U.S. 533 (1964).
"See, e.g., Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969) (congressional districting); Avery
v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (local government reapportionment); Swann v.
Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967) (state legislative reapportionment plan).
"See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
"See text accompanying note 29 supra.
"1402 U.S. at 16.
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racial imbalance of whatever cause. Again, the assertion that the Court
is following traditional equitable principles seems to be contradicted by
the reality of the holding.
The initial inquiry-whether the specific guidelines laid down in
Swann are truly grounded in traditional equitable doctrine-seems to
require a negative conclusion: the commitment in Swann,
notwithstanding its doctrinal language, appears to extend measurably
beyond what courts sitting in equity have undertaken, even in vindication
of constitutional rights. The perceptible disparity between what the Court
in Swann says it is doing and what it actually does-essentially a gap
between principle and rule-portends of more than jurisprudential diffi-
culties.96 Beyond academic difficulties lie identifiable risks which can be
seen as accompanying Swann's significant expansion of federal remedial
power, these risks falling roughly into three interrelated problem areas:
(1) the effectiveness of Swann in fulfilling the promise of Brown I; (2) the
federal courts' role in making fundamental policy decisions; (3) the
Court's dual role as a judicial and political institution. Important to the
task of drawing a perspective on Swann and the concept of affirmative
relief is an examination of the nature of these risks and the extent to
which they might become realities as the process of school desegregation
moves into its third decade.
The Future Role of Swann: Final Step or Transition?
Continuing to speak with emphatic unanimity, the Court in Swann
has revitalized Brown II in pursuit of the eradication of the vestiges of
prior discrimination. With its extensive commitment of federal judicial
power, Swann promises to make the concept of a unitary school system
a reality for those to whom it has been denied; policies which may carry
equal weight with integration in systems with no history of discrimination
are submerged in de jure segregation situations in order to avoid the risk
of inviting further delay and subterfuge. Whatever risks are entailed in
Swann's departure from the traditional role of the federal judiciary seem
initially to pale in light of the unprecedented nature of past obstructionist
tactics.
Thus, nothing could provide a more certain justification for the exten-
sive commitment in Swann than its effectiveness in bringing about con-
crete realization of the promise of Brown L The optimistic hint of finality
in Swann was two-fold: implementation of the specific remedies would
"For an excellent discussion of the doctrinal difficulties in the Warren Court opinions
see A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
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bring the goal of full compliance within immediate reach, 7 and the role
of the federal courts, their powers expanded to meet the felt necessities,
could then substantially diminish. 8 But the pursuit of an effective solution
carries with it the risk that private action may render the goal of unitary
school systems rather meaningless. A distinguished writer has noted the
phenomenon of the "tipping point""8 of integration, wherein, whether
motivated by racism or not, whites flee newly-integrated schools in which
they find themselves in the minority and re-establish in the suburbs or in
private schools. Posing the question whether there are gains in the contin-
ued pursuit of integration sufficient to offset the whites' flight, his re-
sponse is:
What is the use of a process of integration . . . that very often
produces, in absolute numbers, more black and white children
attending segregated schools than before . . . T
Such a situation had developed in Richmond, Virginia, to the point
where the plaintiffs, while continuing to press for full desegregation
within the city,'0' simultaneously pressed the court for a consolidation
decree, thus putting the promise and commitment of Swann to a critical
test. The court in Bradley (Consolidation),'" finding a failure on the part
of the state to fulfill its affirmative duty to overcome the effects of its
prior discriminatory policies, ordered the consolidation of the school
systems of the two outlying counties with that of the city.
It is important to note first the underpinnings of the court's action in
Bradley (Consolidation). The racial imbalance existing between the city
and the counties was seen as more than simply the product of private
action. The state's prior history of discrimination formed a background
97The Court envisaged an end to desegregation litigation in the near future:
At some point, these school authorities and others like them should have
achieved full compliance with this Court's decision in Brown L The sys-
tems would then be "unitary" in the sense required by our decisions in
Green and Alexander.
402 U.S. at 31.
"Recognizing that the desegregated communities will hardly remain static, the Court
declared:
Neither school authorities nor district courts [absent deliberate alteration
of demographic patterns] are constitutionally required to make year-by-
year adjustments . . . once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been
accomplished ....
Id. at 31-32.
"Bickel, Desegregation-Where Do We Go From Here?, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Feb.
7, 1970, at 21.
'00d.
"'ISee Bradley v. School Bd., 325 F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Va. 1971) (City Integration).
"'No. 3353 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 1972).
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against which the court considered the findings as to the city-county lines:
(1) the lines had been deemed less than inviolate on many occasions in
the past when students had been transferred across them to avoid integra-
tion; (2) consolidation, within the power of the state school authorities,
had never been used anywhere in the state for purposes of integration,
and evidence supported the inference that it was strenuously avoided in
Richmond because of the integration that would come about; (3) Rich-
mond, Henrico, and Chesterfield were specifically declared separate
school districts only in 1971.103 The court concluded that the state school
board was not maintaining historically "neutral" city-county lines but
instead was continuing the past policy of using those lines purposefully
to bar effective integration.'04
The defendants' opposition to the crossing of political boundaries for
integration purposes, in light of prior discriminatory crossings evinced a
double standard" 5 which was used to rebut any claim that the borders in
question were of any practical or administrative necessity. That Bradley
(Consolidation) ordered the state to ignore school district lines which are
themselves governmental subdivisions seems well-grounded in similar
11id. at 59. The State Board of Education of Virginia is vested with general supervi-
sory powers over the school system of the state and has the power to make rules for the
management and conduct of schools. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-11, -19 (Supp. 1971). The State
Board prescribes by regulation the division superintendents' duties and powers. No. 3353
at 89.
School divisions of the state have been created or dissolved by the State Board of
Education. Id. at 95. The board's policy has been to encourage consolidation of two or more
sparsely populated rural counties. Whereas that policy would not apply to the areas involved
in Bradley (Consolidation), it should be noted that consolidation has not been used to
ameliorate segregation. Id. at 102. Indeed, the court in Bradley (Consolidation) found the
modification of school division lines had been avoided whenever the result would have been
integration. Id. at 106.
The Virginia Code was amended, subsequent to the initiation of the Bradley (Consoli-
dation) suit, to prohibit the State Board of Education from placing two political subdivisions
in one school division without requests from the school boards involved and the approval
of the governing bodies of those political subdivisions. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-30 (Supp.
1971).
Although the state maintained that consolidation of the districts would only have
resulted in a single superintendent with each board continuing to operate its own schools,
the court in Bradley (Consolidation) found the statement to be inconsistent with the state
law and practice. No. 3353 at 105-06.
1 04Bradley v. School Bd. (Consolidation), No. 3353 at 177-84 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 1972);
accord, United States v. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968), modified, 432
F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971).
"'United States v. Indianola Mun. Separate School Dist., 410 F.2d 626, 628 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 1011 (1970) (previously crossed railroad tracks now sought to
be maintained as boundary for safety reasons).
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desegregation case law1 ' and falls within the following language:
Political subdivisions of the state are mere lines of convenience for
exercising divided governmental responsibilities. They cannot
serve to deny federal rights. 10
Furthermore, Reynolds v. Sims"' has already made clear that the politi-
cal subdivisions of a state are not sovereign entities but rather agents
exercising the state's governmental functions. The state carries a heavy
burden if it wishes to use the integrity of political subdivisions to justify"'
'Natural boundaries are insufficient obstacles to remedial action when zones based
thereon have been gerrymandered to foster segregation. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
445 F.2d 990, 1000 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 707 (1972); United States v.
School Dist. 151,404 F.2d 1125, 1132-34 (7th Cir. 1968), modified, 432 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36, 38-40 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961). But even without evidence of gerrymandering, zones
drawn along natural boundaries may simply fail to fulfill the affirmative duty to overcome
the prior discrimination. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971); Henry
v. Clarksdale Mun. Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d 682, 683 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 940 (1969); United States v. Greenwood Mun. Separate School Dist., 406 F.2d 1086,
1092-93 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 907 (1969).
'Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 920,925 (8th Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court
of New Jersey was faced with a problem somewhat analogous to Bradley (Consolidation)
in Jenkins v. Township of Morris School Dist., 58 N.J. 483, 279 A.2d 619 (1971). In holding
that the State Commissioner of Education could bridge town boundary lines in ascertaining
and disestablishing segregation, the court maintained that such lines were no obstacle to
the vindication of state constitutional rights. It is noteworthy that, as in Bradley
(Consolidation), the area involved was composed of residential, white suburbs and a primar-
ily commercial, black urban center. The court, in viewing the interrelationship between the
two officially separated communities, treated the two as a single community for purposes
of ascertaining racial imbalance.
t-377 U.S. 533 (1964).
10The defendants in Bradley (Consolidation) may nevertheless argue on appeal that
under Reynolds the integrity of city and county lines can be a valid countervailing considera-
tion to the consolidation relief ordered. The Reynolds test may be phrased as follows:
deviations from the strict one-man, one-vote population standard are permissible if
legitimate considerations can be found which serve to further rational policies unless
population is thereby submerged as the controlling standard. 377 U.S. at 579-81. Reynolds
discussed one, perhaps the only one, legitimate consideration which might justify deviations:
giving a voice to political subdivisions as such. Recognizing subdivision integrity would
further two rational policies: (1) maintaining the state's ability to pass local legislation; (2)
avoiding the partisan gerrymandering that might result if subdivision lines were totally
ignored. But even the above considerations would fail if the resulting divergence from the
population standard indicated that population had ceased to become the controlling
standard, i.e., the one-man, one-vote goal must occupy a position of slight dominance over
the value of subdivision integrity. Id. at 580. In light of the above, how would Bradley
(Consolidation) fare? As a threshold matter, the Reynolds test might never be reached for
at least one reason: as noted, evidence of the state's double standard with respect to city-
county lines could work a kind of estoppel against the defendants. But even if the test could
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a failure to perform affirmative constitutional duties: "The political
thicket, having been pierced to protect the vote, can likewise be pierced
to protect the education of children.""'
Assuming for the moment that the Bradley (Consolidation) decision
will be upheld under Swann, the case nevertheless presents with increased
intensity the problems raised previously with respect to Swann's
departure from traditional equitable concepts. As a starting point, it is
submitted that Bradley (Consolidation) speaks primarily to the problem
of white flight and is not grounded on any substantial causal connection
between prior state action and the existing city-county racial imbalance.
Yet, as has been pointed out, Swann did not direct the lower courts to
tailor their remedies to respond only to prior state action. Hence, private
action is reached by consolidation in order to avoid the resegregation
phenomenon; the commitment of equitable power in Swann has been
expanded to counteract the results of white flight.
On the other hand, considering that the finding of inherent inferiority
in separate school systems was the impetus behind Brown I, the pursuit
of integration in Bradley (Consolidation) cannot help but carry more than
a trace of irony for minorities seeking their own cultural identity: "[the]
subtle implication [is] that blacks cannot learn unless in the presence of
whites.""' That Bradley (Consolidation) may well be the first in a long
line of consolidation decrees should be considered in light of the follow-
ing:
[T]he government is . . . putting itself on a collision course with
the aspirations of an articulate and vigorous segment of national
Negro leadership. Even if we succeed at whatever cost, in forcing
• . . massively integrated school systems . . . , may we not find
ourselves eventually dismantling them again at the behest of
blacks seeking decentralized community control?"
2
Bradley (Consolidation) cannot be faulted on the effectiveness of its
be seen to apply to Bradley (Consolidation), apparently the state could not satisfy it. For
assuming that the state could fulfill the "if" clause above as to rational poli-
cies-manageable size of school districts, more local autonomy, use of county tax base-the
state on the facts could be seen as nevertheless having "submerged" the goal of desegrega-
tion as the "controlling factor." Virginia's 1971 law preventing consolidation except upon
local approval indicates that the value of achieving desegregation through consolidation has
been subordinated to the importance of subdivision integrity. Cf Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967).
"'Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40
N.Y.U.L. REv. 285, 305 (1965) (footnote omitted).
"'NEwsWEEK, Mar. 13, 1972, at 21; quoting Mr. Roy Innis of The Congress of Racial
Equality.
"2Bickel, supra note 99, at 22.
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solution in moving one step closer to Brown I. Yet the tendency to press
Swann to outer limits intensifies another risk inherent in Swann's
commitment: the federal courts may find themselves questioned even by
minorities as to their competence to render policy decisions in such a
complex area. Equity should normally act only after a judicious balancing
of competing interests and policies. But Swann, though professing to
apply the balancing principle, has elevated integration as a social policy
to the exclusion of all others. That this approach tends toward rigidity is
illustrated by a recent public housing discrimination case, Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority,"' in which the court was faced with a pat-
tern of discriminatory site selection reinforcing urban residential segrega-
tion. In fashioning a remedy, the court chose the more direct means of
overcoming the prior discrimination: it required that a substantial portion
of future units were to be built in white neighborhoods. Totally ignored
were competing ethnocentric values. 14 Asserting that the court in
Gautreaux failed to appreciate the limits of judicial competence in this
area, a writer critically noted:
An awareness of [a court's] limitations is particularly important
in cases like Gautreaux which, even on remedy, implicitly involve
"1296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.), judgment order entered, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill.
1969), affd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971). The court's
language reflected the single-mindedness of the pursuit of integration:
It is . . . undenied that sites for the projects which have been constructed
were chosen primarily to further the praiseworthy and urgent goals of low
cost housing and urban renewal. Nevertheless, a deliberate policy to sepa-
rate the races cannot be justified by the good intentions with which other
laudable goals are pursued.
296 F. Supp. at 914.
"'One value not fostered by the "integration" ethic is that of building a political and
communal base of solidarity and power on which minority groups can begin to establish
actual equality. Consideration of this kind of alternative was advocated by the late Senator
Robert F. Kennedy, urging the placement of the great majority of new housing in the ghetto:
To seek a rebuilding of our urban slums is not to turn our backs on the
goal of integration. It is only to say that open occupancy laws alone will
not suffice and that sensitivity must be shown to the aspirations of Ne-
groes and other non-whites who would build their own communities and
occupy decent housing in neighborhoods where they now live. And, in the
long run, this willingness to come to grips with blight of our center city
will lead us toward an open society. For it is comparability of housing and
full employment that are the keys to free movement and to the establish-
ment of a society in which each man has a real opportunity to choose
whom he will call neighbor.
Hearings on S. 3029 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate
Banking and Currency Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), quoted in Comment, Public
Housing and Urban Policy: Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 79 YALE L.J. 712,
718 (1970).
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legal institutions in a major, unresolved problem of the country's
future-the question of whether the society will be one where
groups retain their identities or one where the goal is assimilation
of its peoples."'
Whether minority students in Richmond or any other urban area
would prefer to remain in inner-city schools, perhaps with increased edu-
cational expenditures, is of course problematic; nor would this discussion
presume to decide that any given policy is the most propitious. The
essential point is that the viability of possible alternatives does not enter
into any balancing process undertaken by Swann, nor would any lower
court be authorized to consider such claims made on behalf of minori-
ties." But the fact that "equality"-political, social, and eco-
nomic-might best be pursued indirectly through schools to which mate-
rial resources rather than white students are brought is at least a valid
countervailing consideration. In addition, the fact that another segment
of the same minority group might prefer the Bradley (Consolidation)
solution merely serves to heighten the growing strain upon the federal
courts.
Finally, the fact that the Supreme Court exercises both judicial and
political power" 7 intensifies the problems raised by the implementation
of the equity power in Swann in future decisions such as Bradley (Consol-
idation). Constitutional doctrine, judicial power, and political and policy
considerations each exert such conflicting limits and pressures that even
a compromise position may be unsatisfactory. If the Court were to find
that the consolidation decree in Bradley (Consolidation) had gone beyond
the hazy limits of federal remedial power authorized by Swann, the basis
for decision would necessarily rest upon a view that the state had no
affirmative duty to consolidate the system. But that view in turn could
follow only after determining that there was factual error in Bradley's
(Consolidation) finding of a double-standard,"' for otherwise the Court
would be taking what under Swann would be an unacceptable position:
"'Comment, Public Housing and Urban Policy: Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Au-
thority, 79 YALE L.J. 712 (1970).
"'Note 87 supra. It would seem that a federal court could not, once plaintiffs had
shown a violation of the equal protection clause, allow the plaintiffs to tailor their own
remedies, for the benefit of the remedies has traditionally run to the class and not to the
individual litigants. For a court to grant relief, for example, in the form of allowing individ-
ual black or Chinese students to remain in predominately one-race schools could be seen
as contrary to equal protection ideals in that it merely caters to the racial prejudice of the
minority. Even if the motive behind such a demand was asserted to be a non-prejudicial
desire for ethnic solidarity, there would still be the substantial danger that that assertion
could easily be used as a veil for underlying racial prejudices.
"'See Kalven, Even When a Nation Is at War, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 3-4 (1971).
"8See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
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the finding of a constitutional violation for which there was no remedy."9
But even a legally principled reversal of Bradley (Consolidation) would
from a political perspective carry an unmistakable message to the
nation's minority groups: the legislative process-dominated by white




On the other hand, an approval of consolidation as a remedy, while
making Swann a truly effective force against the resegregation phenome-
non, would nevertheless reinforce the federal courts' commitment to the
ethic of integration which, as observed, 121 may soon come into sharp
conflict with the trend toward ethnic solidarity. Furthermore, the hypo-
thetical approval of consolidation as an affirmative duty would almost
certainly be accompanied, under Swann, by the doctrinal limitation to de
jure situations, thus precluding its application to most of the urban North
and West. Although the existing de jure-de facto distinction is grounded
in the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment, the imple-
mentation of a powerful remedy such as consolidation to only a particular
region would not enhance the Court's role as a supposedly national insti-
tution. Such a development would freeze the remedial powers of the
federal courts into a kind of all-or-nothing rigidity, when the asserted
doctrinal basis for those remedial powers was the inherent flexibility of
equity. 2' As one writer has pointed out:
[N]o national institution can afford to be unresponsive to the pop-
ular pressures likely to be engendered by an appearance of differ-
ential treatment of certain regions of the country. Even the Su-
preme Court is not immune from such pressures, particularly
when they become identified with the ideal of equal treatment.' m
"'Such a position would be in direct contradiction to Swann's language. See note 77
supra.
laThe Court could also not help but be aware of the effect a reversal would have in
aggravating the problem of white abandonment of urban areas, creating further racial
imbalance and generally escalating the national urban crisis. See generally E. BANFIELD,
THE UNHEAVENLY CITY (1970).
"'Text accompanying notes I I 1-16 supra.
12See text accompanying note 78 supra.
laFiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School De-
segregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 697, 705 (1971).
12'However, before the Court has an opportunity for exercising possible self-restraint
in cases like Bradley (Consolidation) and beyond, Congress and the White House seem
virtually certain to take some kind of initiative in sharply curtailing the equitable power of
the federal courts to order busing. Bradley (Consolidation) in particular galvanized the anti-
busing sentiments in the populace, and, in an election year, the administration and the
legislators have begun to move toward a statutory limitation of the federal courts' role. How
successful Congress will be in attempting to shrink federal equity power under the four-
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The above scenario contemplates the kind of limits that the Court
might place upon further expansion of its role in reaching the problems
of racial segregation in the schools.'24 Yet the momentum of the promise
in Brown I is not so quickly or easily dissipated. The Court could be seen
as moving along a continuum toward adopting a general result-oriented
approach more responsive on a national level to school segregation and
inferior education.'2 It is to the possible future steps along that contin-
uum that the discussion now turns.
teenth amendment is a question that goes beyond the scope of this discussion, but for an
excellent treatment of the basic framework of the problem see C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 22-26 (2d ed. 1970). The following is a brief summary
of the status of the legislative move against busing. (1) The House passed its version of the
Higher Education Act of 1971, H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971), to which specific
anti-busing measures were amended: (a) district court orders requiring busing to achieve
racial balance shall be stayed until all appeals have been exhausted; (b) funds cannot be
used for busing as part of a desegregation plan; (c) no federal agency can condition receipt
of federal funds upon the adoption of a busing plan. For a full text of the act see 117 CONG.
REC. 10458 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1971). See N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1971, at 1, col. 8. (2) The
Senate, after heated debate during which various stringent anti-busing measures were
proposed and eventually voted down, passed a moderate amendment to the education act
which provided that: (a) no federal funds be used for busing unless requested by local
officials; (b) funds shall not be used for busing which exceeds the limits placed upon
transportation plans by Swann (see text accompanying note 88 supra); (c) federal agencies
may not require busing, as a condition of receiving funds, of students beyond the limits of
Swann or to a school where the educational opportunities are substantially inferior to that
school to which the student would normally have been assigned under a nondiscriminatory
geographic zoning system; (d) any district court order which requires the transportation of
students from one "local educational agency" to another or which requires consolidation
of same for desegregation purposes shall be stayed pending the exhaustion of appeals. But
this provision is to expire on June 30, 1973. For the complete text of the amendment see
118 CONG. REC. 2448 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1972). Senator Scott, who with Senator Mansfield
sponsored the amendment, gave an extensive interpretation of the provisions on the floor
of the Senate. 118 CONG. REc. 2541 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1972). (3) The House and Senate
have now begun meeting in a joint conference, but the House took the unusual measure of
ordering its members of the joint committee not to compromise its anti-busing proposals.
Washington Post, Mar. 9, 1972, at 1, cols. 7-8. (4) President Nixon issued an 8,000-word
message to Congress, calling for immediate legislation to: (a) declare a moratorium on all
court-ordered busing until July 1, 1973; (b) authorize new funds to make the poorer schools
equal in educational opportunity; (c) prohibit future busing orders until a court had ex-
hausted a long list of other remedies and found them inadequate. Washington Post, Mar.
18, 1972, at 1, col. 7.
'For an unenthusiastic view of the Warren Court's moves in the direction of assimila-
tion and egalitarianism see A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
103-81 (1970). But see Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto
Segregation, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 285 (1965).
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IlL De Facto Segregation
De facto segregation is defined as the situation in which "racial imbal-
ance exists in the schools but with no showing that this was brought about
by discriminatory action of state authorities."'' 6 In essence the opposite
of dejure, de facto segregation is a racially imbalanced situation to which
the state has not contributed and for which judicial relief may not be
granted.17 As de jure grew from its traditional definition'2 to include
within the concept of state action policies such as gerrymandering of
districts, building site and size selection, and student transfers by state
agencies to achieve segregation, de facto situations were diminished.
Nonetheless, substantial de facto segregation remains.
If segregation is to be eliminated, only judicial action can be expected
to provide meaningful relief. Since there is no per se constitutional right
to integration, 2 1 it would seem that there are three major alternatives by
which judicial remedies may be made to reach those situations which are
presently considered de facto and, therefore, not subject to judicial relief
in desegregation cases: (1) judicial extension of those acts which will be
recognized as state action in finding de jure segregation, (2) showings by
plaintiffs of actual inequality in schools, grounding the claim upon denial
of equal protection through inferior education rather than through segre-
gation, and (3) the bringing of suits aimed at the real causes of de facto
segregation (e.g., discriminatory administration of public housing, une-
qual employment opportunities). As will be seen, the third category is
probably the most helpful and presently fruitful approach.
The first alternative is nothing more than a projection of the judicial
trend in school segregation cases since Brown L It would be possible for
the courts to employ a sort of tort theory, based on foreseeability, to the
school board's assignment policies. If the geographic proximity-type plan
is superimposed on a segregated residential pattern, the result is foreseea-
ble. Knowing this result to be inevitable, the school board which combines
this plan with the legal compulsion to attend school can be said to have
violated the constitutional mandate of Brown L The compulsory atten-
dance law would be the basis for a finding of state-imposed segrega-
"'Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971).
"'Spencer v. Kugler, 92 S. Ct. 707 (1972); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965); Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
'Irhe Court recently articulated the traditional de jure segregation as "a mandate by
the legislature, carried into effect by a school board, whereby students were assigned to
schools solely by race." Gomperts v. Chase, 92 S. Ct. 16 (1971).
IaDowns v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988, 998 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
914 (1965); Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
924 (1964).
1972]
306 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
tion. 3° Alternatively, the above situation could afford only a presump-
tion that the school board was intentionally segregating, especially where
other, equally feasible zones would have resulted in less imbalance. This
approach is simply an extension to all segregated systems of the existing
presumption against school boards which are found to have previously
maintained dual systems. However, the difference between the ap-
proaches is negligible since both are severely limited if there are no other
reasonable means to set up the school districts. Since good faith would
probably be relevant in both instances, 1 3 the absence of racially oriented
motive in the continued maintenance of this segregation may be evi-
denced by such factors as safety of students, costs incident to change, and
the availability of facilities . 3 Nonetheless, the showing necessary to
rebut the presumption and avoid judicial intervention would be a difficult
one. It is conceivable that a substantial portion of presently de facto
situations would be affected.
Further, state government is heavily implicated in any form of resi-
dential segregation. By taking a broader look at state policy and all
contributing state agencies, the federal courts would be more successful
in finding state complicity in segregation. Whether the policies have been
racial residential zoning, enforcement of restrictive covenants,
cooperation with prior FHA segregative policies, discriminatory public
housing administration, or discrimination in job opportunities, 3 state
discrimination can be found. 34 Such discrimination has resulted in segre-
gated patterns into which minority groups have been sealed by school
board zoning. Although the above suggestions are fully consistent with
the language of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court has not
been willing to move this far. Indeed, it appears that Swann is a tempo-
rary stopping point for doctrinal advance in this area. While not expressly
rejecting the possibility of finding state discrimination in areas other than
school segregation, the opinion has been shown to indicate that school
desegregation cases should not be made to correct segregation resulting
from that other discrimination. 3 5 At best the suggestions are only a
hopeful projection of future Supreme Court decisions.
'3See Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
13 Text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
132See People v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 19 Cal. App. 3d 252, 262, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 658, 663-64 (Ct. App. 1971).
1 3See Hearings before the Subcomm. on Education of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 352-54 (1970).
'See Bradley v. School Bd. (Consolidation), No. 3353 at 253, 289-302, 321-22 (E.D.
Va. Jan. 5, 1972). While the holding is based primarily upon the prior existence of a state-
imposed dual system, the research on other areas of government discrimination is compre-
hensive.
' Text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
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Gomperts v. Chase,'36 a recent Supreme Court decision, may indicate
that the Court will follow the projection. Although a preliminary injunc-
tion was denied because the opening of school was three days away and
confusion might result from the proposed desegregation plan, interesting
questions were raised. While there was no evidence that a dual school
system had contributed to the existing segregation, the argument was that
other state discrimination had created de jure segregation. The alleged
discriminatory actions relied upon were: (1) a major freeway isolated
blacks and resulted in a separate black high school; (2) state planning
groups fashioned and built a black community around that school; (3)
realtors, licensed by the state, practiced discrimination; (4) banks chart-
ered by the state shaped the policies that handicapped blacks in financing
homes outside the black ghetto; (5) residential segregation, fostered by
state-enforced restrictive covenants, resulted in segregated schools. The
Court indicated that although this was not a classical de jure situation,
the question of whether the five factors would add up to de jure segrega-
tion in the sense of state action condemned in Brown I had not yet been
decided by the Court. The opinion can be understood as an indication that
the Court will be willing to listen to arguments based upon this sort of
causal chain. If so, it is perhaps the start of further doctrinal advances.
The second alternative by which judicial remedies may be expanded,
that of showing a denial of equal protection through inferiority of educa-
tion in segregated schools, retains the use of the fourteenth amendment
but shifts emphasis to inequality of the schools themselves when there is
no showing of state-imposed segregation. No longer is the focus upon the
official's motives but upon the detriment occurring in the racially imbal-
anced school. What is being urged in this context is a revival of the Plessy
v. Ferguson'37 mandate that separate facilities be equal:
[I]f white and Negroes, or rich and poor, are to be consigned to
separate schools . . . the minimum the Constitution will require
and guarantee is that for their objectively measureable aspects
these schools be run on the basis of real equality, at least unless
any inequalities are adequately justified.138
Since an adequate justification as quoted above may be virtually impossi-
ble to prove,' a showing of inequality is, for practical purposes, the
establishment of a constitutional violation.
A true inequality must be shown, with reliance being placed on "im-
perfect indices of quality, such as- overcrowding, differences in curricula,
1-92 S. Ct. 16 (1971).
1-163 U.S. 537 (1896).
'Hobson .v Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 496 (D.D.C. 1967).
129d. at 506-08.
1972]
308 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
tenure of teachers, costs per pupil, or scores on standardized tests."'40
Although Brown I indicates that separate schools are inherently unequal,
it does not go as far as equating inequality with a constitutional violation.
In order to find a violation, it must be shown that the state has denied
equality when it has not contributed to the segregation. Therefore, if
reliance is placed upon such intangible considerations as the ability to
engage in discussions and exchange views with students of other back-
grounds,14' the courts would come close to basing decisions upon inherent
inequality through segregation. The question of whether racial segrega-
tion in public schools denies the minority group equal educational oppor-
tunities is a question of fact dependent upon the circumstances in the
particular case. Considerations ofjudicial administration may prompt the
courts to create presumptions of inadequacy in public schools. These
presumptions would overcome the greatest difficulty of this approach,
that of showing actual inequality when reference must be to indecisive
factors, but such presumptions, even if not conclusive, appear to be an
adoption of Brown I's "separate is unequal" without Brown's corollary
of state-imposition.
In a general way, the potential remedy for this approach may provide
more than a "segregated equality."'4 2 Since the suit might well be based
upon class discrimination in inferior slum schools rather than upon racial
discrimination, there would be three alternative remedies: (1) the upgrad-
ing of the inferior schools, (2) a sharing of the inferior facilities by all
classes, or (3) a decree enabling the state to choose between the above
two. The probable inadequacy of a court order in upgrading a facility in
regard to hard-to-measure factors may lead to the less complicated order
to integrate in such a way that all classes share both superior and inferior
facilities. Practically, therefore, a duty to integrate racially may be the
ultimate result just as it was through Brown I's order running to state-
maintained dual systems.
Nonetheless, the undesirable nature of relying upon questionable data
and the heavy burden of proof in showing actual inequality make this
second alternative, like the first, more hopeful than productive. The third
alternative, the approach suggested by Swann, 4 seems the most
promising:
On the national level, housing segregation is the principal basis for
school segregation . . . . Employment, education, and housing
"Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78
HARV. L. REV. 564, 604 (1965).
"'See MeLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
112See Gomperts v. Chase, 92 S. Ct. 16 (1971).
"1402 U.S. at 22.
